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Abstract—We introduce Competing Mobile Network Game
(CMNG), a stochastic game played by cognitive radio net-
works that compete for dominating an open spectrum access.
Differentiated from existing approaches, we incorporate both
communicator and jamming nodes to form a network for friendly
coalition, integrate antijamming and jamming subgames into
a stochastic framework, and apply Q-learning techniques to
solve for an optimal channel access strategy. We empirically
evaluate our Q-learning based strategies and ﬁnd that Minimax-
Q learning is more suitable for an aggressive environment than
Nash-Q while Friend-or-foe Q-learning can provide the best
solution under distributed mobile ad hoc networking scenarios
in which the centralized control can hardly be available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radios have arisen commercially over the last
decade, enabling a new means to share radio spectrum.
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) [1] is a compelling usage
scenario for the cognitive radio system. DSA aims to relieve
shortages of radio spectrum, which is the scarcest—hence,
the most expensive—resource to build a wireless network.
Much of contemporary research has viewed cognitive radios
as the secondary user of a licensed spectrum and focused on
the development of a ﬂexible mechanism to opportunistically
access the licensed channel to its maximal spectral efﬁciency.
While cognitive radios are deemed a commercial success,
their applicability in tactical wireless networking is even more
adequate. The central concept behind the cognitive radio
system is intelligent decision making, which makes it suitable
for operating in a hostile, competing wireless environment. In
this paper, we introduce Competing Mobile Network Game
(CMNG) where radio nodes form a tactical wireless network
and strategize holistically as a team to best its opponent in
dominating the access to an open spectrum. We are particularly
interested in leveraging knowledge acquired through sensing
and learning to overcome extreme operational characteristics
of the radio network such as jamming attacks. Also, our
tactical settings embrace jamming as a strategy to suppress
communication activities of an opponent.
In an antijamming game, the radio network attempts to
maximize its communication utility under the presence of
hostile jamming devices, whereas its friendly jammers aim to
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minimize the opposing network’s communication in a jamming
game. Existing game-theoretic frameworks for cognitive radios
[2]–[4] have treated the antijamming and jamming problems
separately. We depart from the existing approaches and in-
tegrate antijamming and jamming games to jointly solve for
an optimal strategy, exploring Q-learning techniques used in
reinforcement learning. Given an optimistic assumption of
perfect sensing at the lower layer that allows correct outcome
of a channel to be fed back, Q-learning can result in optimal
channel access decisions that lead to the best cumulative
average reward in a steady state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we explain our system model and underlying assumptions.
Section III presents mathematical formulation of CMNG. In
Section IV, we apply reinforcement learning to determine
optimal strategies for CMNG and show how Q-learning can be
used to solve antijamming and jamming games. We propose
both centralized and distributed control approaches based on
Minimax-Q, Nash-Q, and Friend-or-foe Q-learning algorithms.
In Section V, we evaluate the proposed methods with numer-
ical simulation and analyze their performance. In Section VI,
we discuss related work and provide the context of our work.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MODEL
A. Competing Mobile Networks
For clarity of discussion, let us consider two mobile net-
works, namely Blue Force (BF) or the ally and Red Force
(RF) or the enemy networks. Each network consists of two
types of nodes: communicator (comm) node and jammer. BF
and RF networks compete ﬁercely to achieve higher comm
data throughput and prevent the opponent’s comm activities
by jamming. The primary-secondary user dichotomy popular
in the DSA literature is not applicable here, and little or
no ﬁxed infrastructural support is assumed. Mobile ad hoc
network (MANET) would be the most convincing network
model, but the network-wide cooperation and strategic use
of jamming against the opponent are critical to design a
winning media access scheme. A competing mobile network
can adopt a centralized control model where the node actions
are coordinated through a singular entity that makes coherent,
network-wide decisions. On the other hand, a distributed
control model allows each node to decide its own action. We
will evaluate both models in later sections of this paper.2
B. Communication Model
Spectrum available for open access is partitioned in time
and frequency. There are N non-overlapping channels located
at the center frequency fi (MHz) with bandwidth Bi (Hz) for
i = 1;:::;N. A transmission opportunity is represented by a
tuple hfi;Bi;t;Ti, which designates a frequency-time slot at
channel i and time t with time duration T (msec) as depicted
in Fig. 1. We assume a simple CSMA in which comm nodes
ﬁrst sense before transmitting in a slot of opportunity.
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Fig. 1. Transmission opportunity hfi;Bi;t;Ti (shaded region)
In order to coordinate a coherent spectrum access and
jamming strategy network-wide, we assume that the nodes
(both comm and jammers) exchange necessary information
via control messages. We call the channels used to exchange
control messages ‘control channels.’ On the contrary, ‘data
channels’ are used to transport regular data packets. We
follow the DSA approach [2] that control or data channels are
dynamically determined and allocated. When a network ﬁnds
all of its control channels blocked (e.g., due to jamming) at
time t, the spectrum access at time t+1 will be uncoordinated.
C. Jamming
Xu et al. [5] provides widely accepted taxonomy of jam-
mers. A constant jammer continuously dissipates power into
a selected channel by transmitting arbitrary waveforms. A
deceptive jammer can instead send junk bits encapsulated in
a legitimate packet and conceal its intent to disrupt comm
nodes. A random jammer alternates between jamming and
remaining quiet for random time intervals. A reactive jammer
listens to the channel, stays quiet when the channel is idle, and
starts transmitting upon sensing an activity. We add strategic
jammer into the existing taxonomy, which is similar to the
statistical jammer described in Pajic and Mangharam [6]. A
strategic jammer, however, is more intelligent—it can adapt to
media accessing patterns of comm nodes, learn antijamming
schemes, and operate without being detected for long, causing
severe damages.
D. Rewards
A comm node receives a reward of B (bits) upon a suc-
cessful transmission at the attempted slot. Deﬁnition of the
successful transmission follows the classic ALOHA, which
requires that there should be only one comm node transmission
per Tx opportunity. If there were two or more simultaneous
TABLE I
OUTCOME AND RESULTING REWARD AT TX OPPORTUNITY SLOT
BF BF RF RF
comm jammer comm jammer Outcome Reward
Tx ? ? ? BF Tx success RBF +=B
? Jam Tx ? BF jamming RBF +=B
Tx Jam ? ? BF misjamming None
? ? Tx ? RF Tx success RRF +=B
Tx ? ? Jam RF jamming RRF +=B
? ? Tx Jam RF misjamming None
Tx ? Tx ? Tx collision None
transmissions at a Tx opportunity (regardless of the same or
opposing network comm nodes), a collision would occur, and
no comm node gets a reward.
Jammers do not create any reward by themselves but can
take away an opposing comm node’s otherwise successful
transmission. For example, a BF jammer earns a reward B by
jamming the slot in which a sole RF comm node transmits.
If there were no jamming, the RF comm node would have
earned B. Also, a BF jammer can jam a BF comm mistakenly
(e.g., due to faulty intra-network coordination), which we call
misjamming. Table I summarizes the outcome at a slot of
transmission opportunity (‘?’ means no action).
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF COMPETING
MOBILE NETWORK GAME (CMNG)
This section provides formal introduction of Competing
Mobile Network Game (CMNG), a stochastic game for com-
peting cognitive radio networks, Blue Force (BF) and Red
Force (RF).
A. Basic Deﬁnitions and Objective
We deﬁne CMNG the tuple:
GCMNG = hS;AB;AR;R;Ti
where S is the set of states, and AB = fAB;comm;AB;jamg,
AR = fAR;comm;AR;jamg are the action sets of BF and RF
networks. Notice that the action sets break down to include
both the comm and jammer actions. CMNG is a stochastic
game [7], which extends Markov Decision Process (MDP) [8]
by incorporating an agent as the game’s policy maker that
interacts with an environment possibly containing other agents.
Under the centralized control model (Section II.A), CMNG
considers one agent per network that computes strategies for
all nodes in the network whereas there are multiple agents (i.e.,
each node) per network under the distributed control model.
We interchangeably use the terms strategy and policy of the
stochastic game  : S ! PD(A) that denotes the probability
distribution over the action set. CMNG has the reward function
R : S 
Q
AfB;Rg;fcomm;jamg ! R that maps node actions
at a given state to a reward value. The state transition function
T : S 
Q
AfB;Rg;fcomm;jamg ! PD(S) is the probability
distribution over S. S;A;, and R evolve over time, thus are
functions of time. We use a lower case letter with superscripted
t for their realization in time (not tth power of), e.g., st (2 S)
means the CMNG state at time t, and similarly at
B (2 AB)
and at
R (2 AR) for BF and RF node actions at t.3
TABLE II
COLLISION PARAMETERS
Parameter Description
IB;C # of control channel collisions caused by BF comms only
IB;D # of data channel collisions caused by BF comms only
IR;C # of control channel collisions caused by RF comms only
IR;D # of data channel collisions caused by RF comms only
IBR;C # of control channel collisions caused by BF and RF comms
IBR;D # of data channel collisions caused by BF and RF comms
The objective of CMNG is to win in the competition of
dominating the open spectrum access, which can be achieved
by transporting or jamming more comm data bits. For BF
network, this is equivalent to ﬁnd an optimal distribution 
of possible actions that maximizes the expected cumulative
sum of discounted rewards:
 = argmax
 E
"
1 X
t=0
tR(st;at
B;at
R)
#
(1)
where  is a reward discount ratio, strategy  decides BF node
actions, RF node actions are measurable to determine the state,
and the reward can be observed over time.
B. States and Actions
Consider that the spectrum under competition is partitioned
in N channels, each of which can be described by a Markov
chain. If there are L discrete states for each channel, we
require to track LN states for CMNG. Unfortunately, this
results in O(LN), an exponential complexity class with respect
to the number of channels. We instead choose a terser state
representation s = hIC;ID;JC;JDi where IC denotes the
number of control channels collided, ID the number of data
channels collided, JC the number of control channels jammed,
and JD the number of data channels jammed.
Given the current state and the action sets of BF and RF
nodes, the next state of CMNG is computable. The actions
of the opponent is inferred from channel measurements and
sensing. To estimate IC, ID, JC, and JD, we need to observe
the parameters in Tables II and III to calculate
IC =
X
x2fB;R;BRg
Ix;C
ID =
X
x2fB;R;BRg
Ix;D
JC =
X
x2fB;Rg;y2fB;R;BRg
Jx;y;C
JD =
X
x2fB;Rg;y2fB;R;BRg
Jx;y;D
For illustrative purposes, we present an example where
each BF and RF network has C = 2 comm nodes and
J = 2 jammers, and there are N = 10 channels in the
spectrum. Suppose the channels are numbered 1;:::;10. The
BF node actions at t are at
B = hat
B;comm;at
B;jami where
at
B;comm and at
B;jam are vectors of sizes C and J, and
similarly at
R = hat
R;comm;at
R;jami for the RF node actions.
Let at
B;comm = [7 3]; this means that BF comm node 1
TABLE III
JAMMING PARAMETERS
Parameter Description
JB;R;C # of BF control channel jammed by RF jammers
JB;R;D # of BF data channel jammed by RF jammers
JB;B;C # of BF control channel jammed by BF jammers
JB;B;D # of BF data channel jammed by BF jammers
JB;BR;C # of BF control channel jammed by BF and RF jammers
JB;BR;D # of BF data channel jammed by BF and RF jammers
JR;B;C # of RF control channel jammed by BF jammers
JR;B;D # of RF data channel jammed by BF jammers
JR;R;C # of RF control channel jammed by RF jammers
JR;R;D # of RF data channel jammed by RF jammers
JR;BR;C # of RF control channel jammed by BF and RF jammers
JR;BR;D # of RF data channel jammed by BF and RF jammers
transmits in channel 7, and BF comm node 2 in channel
3. Let at
B;jam = [1 5]; that is, BF jammer 1 jams channel
1, and BF jammer 2 jams channel 5. For RF network, let
at
R;comm = [3 5] and at
R;jam = [10 9]. Also, BF network
uses channel 2 for control, and the RF control channel is
channel 1. These node actions and control channel usages form
a bitmap shown in Fig. 2 where 1 indicates transmit, jam, or
markup as control channel, and 0 otherwise. Both BF jammers
are successful here, jamming the RF control and comm data
transmissions in channels 1 and 5, respectively. BF and RF
comm data transmissions collide in channel 3, and BF has
a successful data transmission in channel 7 whereas RF has
no success in comm data. RF jammers end up unsuccessfully,
jamming empty channels 9 and 10. This example results in
state st = hIC = 0;ID = 1;JC = 1;JD = 1i.
 
Channel # 
BF comm Tx 
BF jamming 
RF comm Tx 
RF jamming 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
BF control 
RF control 
BF jamming success 
on RF control channel 
BF and RF comms 
collide on data Tx 
BF jamming success 
on RF comm data Tx 
BF comm  
Tx success 
RF jamming  on channels 
9 and 10 unsuccessful 
Fig. 2. CMNG action-state computation example
C. State Transition Probability Distribution
In this section, we derive the full, analytical formula for
the CMNG state transition probability distribution that can be
used for numerical approximation.
1) Counting parameters for state transition: The following
conditional probability distribution determines the transition
function T:
p(st+1jst;at
B;at
R)
= p(I
t+1
C ;I
t+1
D ;J
t+1
C ;J
t+1
D jIt
C;It
D;Jt
C;Jt
D;at
B;at
R)
To express I
t+1
C ;I
t+1
D ;J
t+1
C , and J
t+1
D , we need to deﬁne the
counting parameters related to collision and jamming:4
 mC1
def = # of collided control channels previously uncollided
and unjammed;
 mC2
def = # of collided control channels previously collided;
 mC3
def = # of collided control channels previously jammed;
 mD1
def = # of collided data channels previously uncollided and
unjammed;
 mD2
def = # of collided data channels previously collided;
 mD3
def = # of collided data channels previously jammed;
 nC1
def = # of jammed control channels previously uncollided
and unjammed;
 nC2
def = # of jammed control channels previously collided;
 nC3
def = # of jammed control channels previously jammed;
 nD1
def = # of jammed data channels previously uncollided and
unjammed;
 nD2
def = # of jammed data channels previously collided;
 nD3
def = # of jammed data channels previously jammed.
Now we can write the number of collided control channels
I
t+1
C = mC1 +mC2 +mC3, the total number of collided data
channels I
t+1
D = mD1 + mD2 + mD3, the jammed control
channels J
t+1
C = nC1 + nC2 + nC3, and the jammed data
channels J
t+1
D = nD1 + nD2 + nD3.
We deﬁne the counting parameters that describe how BF
and RF networks choose control and data channels at time t:
 
t
C1
def = # of control channels chosen from previously uncollided
and unjammed channel space;
 
t
D1
def = # of data channels chosen from previously uncollided
and unjammed channel space;
 
t
C2
def = # of control channels chosen from previously collided
channel space;
 
t
D2
def = # of data channels chosen from previously collided
channel space;
 
t
C3
def = # of control channels chosen from previously jammed
channel space;
 
t
D3
def = # of data channels chosen from previously jammed
channel space.
We deﬁne the parameters to describe how BF and RF
jamming actions are chosen at t:
 
t
I1
def = # of channels chosen from previously uncollided channel
space for jamming;
 
t
I2
def = # of channels chosen from previously collided channel
space for jamming;
 
t
J1
def = # of channels chosen from previously unjammed
channel space for jamming;
 
t
J2
def = # of channels chosen from previously jammed channel
space for jamming.
We have a constraint t
C1 + t
D1 < Nt
1 where Nt
1 = N  
(It
C +It
D+Jt
C +Jt
D) gives the total number of uncollided and
unjammed channels. We also have t
C2 + t
D2 < Nt
2 where
Nt
2 = It
C + It
D is the total number of collided channels, and
t
C3 + t
D3 < Nt
3 where Nt
3 = Jt
C + Jt
D is the total number
of jammed channels.
2) Combinatorial analysis: We should consider combina-
tions of (mCf1;2;3g, mDf1;2;3g) and (nCf1;2;3g, nDf1;2;3g)
subject to the constraints represented by IC, ID, JC, and JD.
Using the binomial coefﬁcient
 n
k

= n!
k!(n k)!, the probability
of mC1 control and mD1 data channels collided given that
BF and RF networks choose from previously uncollided and
unjammed channels is:
p(mC1;mD1jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
 t
C1
mC1
 t
D1
mD1
  Nt
1 t
C1 t
D1
t
I1+t
J1 mC1 mD1

  Nt
1
t
I1+t
J1

The probability of mC2 control and mD2 data channels col-
lided given that BF and RF networks choose from previously
collided channels is:
p(mC2;mD2jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
 t
C2
mC2
 t
D2
mD2
  Nt
2 t
C2 t
D2
t
I2 mC2 mD2

  Nt
2
t
I2

The probability of mC3 control and mD3 data channels col-
lided given that BF and RF networks choose from previously
jammed channels is:
p(mC3;mD3jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
 t
C3
mC3
 t
D3
mD3
  Nt
3 t
C3 t
D3
t
J2 mC3 mD3

  Nt
3
t
J2

The probability of nC1 control and nD1 data channels
jammed given that BF and RF networks choose from pre-
viously uncollided and unjammed channels is:
p(nC1;nD1jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
 t
C1
nC1
 t
D1
nD1
  Nt
1 t
C1 t
D1
t
I1+t
J1 nC1 nD1

  Nt
1
t
I1+t
J1

The probability of nC2 control and nD2 data channels
jammed given that BF and RF networks choose from pre-
viously collided channels is:
p(nC2;nD2jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
 t
C2
nC2
 t
D2
nD2
 Nt
2 t
C2 t
D2
t
I2 nC2 nD2

  Nt
2
t
I2

The probability of nC3 control and nD3 data channels
jammed given that BF and RF networks choose from pre-
viously jammed channels is:
p(nC3;nD3jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R) =
 t
C3
nC3
 t
D3
nD3
  Nt
3 t
C3 t
D3
t
J2 nC3 nD3

  Nt
3
t
J2

3) Posterior distribution: The combinatorial analysis leads
to the posterior state transition probability distribution for
CMNG presented in Eq. (2). To solve for an optimal strategy,
we need to evaluate this posterior distribution. Unfortunately,
the dynamic settings of CMNG (e.g., changes in number
of channels, comm nodes, jammers) make the analytical
computation difﬁcult. Moreover, it would be impractical to
rework Eq. (2) whenever a CMNG parameter changes or nodes
join and exit their network. We can alternatively sample the
distribution, using a statistically rigorous technique such as
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC); however, the MCMC5
performance relies on the choice of a proposal distribution that
must work well for CMNG, which by itself is an active area of
research. In the next section, we propose Q-learning [9] based
methods that can avoid complex state transition computations
by a technique called value iteration [10].
IV. DETERMINING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES WITH
Q-LEARNING
As a decision maker, the agent in Q-learning has a choice
to maximize the reward by choosing the best known action or
trying out one of the other actions in the hope of better payoffs
in the long run. The former strategy is termed exploitation,
and the latter exploration. In this section, we propose three
comparable methods based on Minimax-Q [11], Nash-Q [12],
and Friend-or-foe Q [13] learning algorithms that can solve
for optimal antijamming and jamming strategies in CMNG.
A. Q-learning Background
Q-learning evaluates the quality of an action possible at
a particular state and the value of that state. The Bellman
equations characterize such optimization:
Q(s;a) = R(s;a) + 
X
s0
p(s0js;a)V (s0) (3)
V (s) = max
a0 Q(s;a0) (4)
The key strength of Q-learning is the value iteration technique
that an agent performs an update Q(s;a) = R(s;a)+V (s0)
in place of Eq. (3) without explicit knowledge of transition
probability p(s0js;a). We remind that a strategy  is the prob-
ability distribution of actions a at state s. Linear programming
can solve for  = argmax
P
a Q(s;a) in place of Eq. (4).
B. Decomposition of CMNG
The coexistence of the two opposing kinds (i.e., comm
and jammer) in BF and RF networks decomposes CMNG
into two subgames, namely antijamming and jamming games.
Fig. 3 illustrates the antijamming-jamming relationship among
the nodes. In antijamming game, the BF comm nodes strive
to maximize their throughput primarily by avoiding hostile
jamming from the RF jammers. Additionally, imperfect co-
ordination within the BF network that causes a BF jammer
to jam its own BF comm node (i.e., misjamming) should be
avoided. Collision avoidance among comm nodes is another
objective of antijamming game.
In jamming game, the BF jammers try to minimize the
RF data throughput by choosing the best channels to jam.
A BF jammer can target a data channel frequently accessed
by the RF comm nodes or alternatively aims for an RF
control channel, which would result a small immediate reward
but a potentially larger value in the future by blocking RF
data trafﬁc. Misjamming avoidance is also an objective for
jamming game. For BF network, the primary means to avoid
misjamming in jamming game is to coordinate the actions of
the BF jammers. This is different for the case of antijamming
game where the avoidance is done by coordinating the actions
of the BF comm nodes.
BF 
Comm 
BF 
Jammer 
RF 
Jammer 
RF 
Comm 
Anti-jamming game 
Jamming game 
Fig. 3. Antijamming and jamming relationship
C. Minimax-Q Learning for CMNG
Minimax-Q assumes a zero-sum game that implies
QB(st;at
B;at
R) =  QR(st;at
B;at
R) = Q(st;at
B;at
R). This
holds tightly for the CMNG jamming subgame where the
jammer’s gain is precisely the comm throughput loss of the
opponent. In order to solve antijamming and jamming sub-
games jointly, we propose a slight modiﬁcation to the original
Minimax-Q algorithm in Littman [11]. First, we divide the
strategy of BF network B into its antijamming and jamming
substrategies, B1 and B2. Then, we add an extra minimax
operator to our value function in Eq. (5). The modiﬁed Q-
function in Eq. (6) can be computed iteratively, using Eqs. (7)
and (8). t gives the learning rate that decays over time,
t+1 = t   for 0 <  < 1.
D. Nash-Q Learning for CMNG
Nash-Q [12] can solve a general-sum game in addition
to zero-sum games. This makes an important distinction to
Minimax-Q although the Nash-Q value function for a zero-sum
game in Eq. (9) is different from Eq. (5) by only one extra
term ^ R(at
R). This means that Nash-Q requires to estimate
the policy of the opponent’s agent. For CMNG, the BF agent
needs to learn ^ R1 and ^ R2, the antijamming and jamming
substrategies of RF network. The Q-function for the zero-
sum Nash-Q is given by Eq. (10). For a general-sum game,
the BF agent should compute QB and QR separately at the
same time while observing its reward rt
B = rB(st;at
B;at
R)
and estimating the RF rt
R by Eqs. (11) and (12). Nash-Q
emphasizes the ﬁnding of a joint equilibrium under the mixed
strategies (B; ^ R).
E. Friend-or-foe Q-learning (FFQ) for CMNG
Although Nash-Q is applicable to both zero-sum and
general-sum games, its convergence guarantee is consid-
ered too restrictive [13]. Game-theoretically, Friend-or-foe Q-
learning (FFQ) introduced in Littman 2001 [13] does not
solve any new problem. FFQ is a computational enhancement6
p(I
t+1
C ;I
t+1
D ;J
t+1
C ;J
t+1
D jI
t
C;I
t
D;J
t
C;J
t
D;a
t
B;a
t
R)
=
X
It+1
C =mC1+mC2+mC3
It+1
D =mD1+mD2+mD3
Jt+1
C =nC1+nC2+nC3
Jt+1
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and provides better convergence properties by relaxing the
restrictive conditions of Nash-Q. For this relaxation, FFQ
requires extra information that other agents in the game should
be classiﬁed friendly cooperative or hostile.7
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF SIMULATION SETUP
Parameter Description Value used
N # of channels 10
Ncomm # of comm nodes per network 2
Njam # of jammers per network 2
pTx Node’s Tx probability 1
B Reward for successful Tx 1
 Total # of time slots simulated 2,000
In FFQ, the BF agent maintains only one Q-function:
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If the opponent (RF agent) is identiﬁed as a friend, the Q-
function for the BF network is updated by
	B = max
at
B;at
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QB(st;at
B;at
R) (14)
On the other hand, if the opponent is considered a foe, the
Q-function is updated under the minimax criterion
	B = max
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min
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X
at
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R)B(at
R) (15)
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Minimax-
Q, Nash-Q, and FFQ learning based strategies under the 2-
network CMNG of Blue and Red Forces.
A. Implementation
We have implemented Minimax-Q, Nash-Q, and FFQ learn-
ing algorithms in MATLAB, using linprog function from
Optimization Toolbox. We require to maintain the Q table,
which is a three-dimensional array that can be looked up using
state, BF and RF action vectors. At the end of each time slot,
we compute the next state from the sensing result of each
channel. Recall that state computation is done by counting
IC, ID, JC, and JD parameters described in Section II.B. The
action vector space is discrete, and we have pre-generated and
indexed all possible action vectors for BF and RF. A strategy 
is a two-dimensional array indexed by state and action vector
(either BF or RF). The V table for the value function is indexed
only by state.
The key is to integrate the updates for Q and V tables with
a linear program that ﬁnds the optimal distribution  at each
iteration. The procedure (for BF) is summarized below.
1) At current state s, choose a_BF according to pi[s,:]
and execute
2) Sense RF node actions a_RF, observe instantaneous
reward r, and compute next state s’
3) Update Q[s,a_BF,a_RF]
4) Solve linear program to rebalance pi[s,:]
5) Update V[s]
6) Decay learning rate alpha, transit to s’ by s=s’, and
go back to Step 1 and repeat
We rewrite the minimax optimization
max
"
min
X
i
Qii
#
s.t. ...
to be solved by linprog to:
max y s.t. y 
X
i
Qii; ...
Modiﬁed V-functions in Eqns. (5) and (9) feature double
minimax operators due to splitting CMNG into two subgames.
There are two ways to solve these double minimax optimiza-
tions. First, we can assign a priority for each subgame and
solve the higher priority subgame ﬁrst (e.g., relax B1 before
B2). This approach, however, requires to solve two linear
programs in series. We can instead bind aB;comm and aB;jam
into one vector after disallowing some obviously harmful
actions between a comm node and jammer in the same team
(e.g., actions lead to misjamming) and solve only one linear
program per iteration. Our results are based on the second
approach.
B. Simulation Setup
Table IV describes simulation parameters and the values
used. The spectrum under competition has N = 10 channels.
Both BF and RF networks have 2 comm nodes and 2 jammers.
We set each node’s Tx probability pTx = 1. Therefore, all
nodes in BF and RF networks transmit at every time slot. Upon
a successful (i.e., uncollided and unjammed) transmission, the
comm node earns a reward B for its network. Similarly, the
network for a jammer receives B when the jammer makes a
successful jamming. We normalize B to 1, which translates to
the maximum possible reward of 4 for each network at each
time slot. For example, when all two BF jammers successfully
jam the two RF comm nodes and the BF comm nodes
transmit without collision or being jammed by RF jammers,
BF network will receive a reward value of 4. Each network
is assumed to use only one control channel. When Q-learning
is used and the control channel gets jammed, the agent will
receive no information update, halt in the next time slot, and
not compute V- and Q-functions or . We simulate each run
for 2,000 time slots and observe reward performances.
C. Experimental Scenarios
We conﬁgure BF network to run strategies based on Q-
learning and RF network to run simple, non-learning strategies
static and random. Under the static strategy, RF comm nodes
and jammers act on statically pre-conﬁgured channels that
remain the same during a simulation. Under the random
algorithm, the RF nodes choose uniformly random channels
at each time slot. We have simulated all 6 possible scenarios
for CMNG between BF and RF networks:
1) Minimax-Q (BF) vs. Static (RF)
2) Nash-Q (BF) vs. Static (RF)
3) FFQ (BF) vs. Static (RF)
4) Minimax-Q (BF) vs. Random (RF)
5) Nash-Q (BF) vs. Random (RF)
6) FFQ (BF) vs. Random (RF)8
D. Results and Discussion
We adopt average cumulative reward of a network over time
as the performance evaluation metric:
 R =
1

 X
t=1
Ntot X
k=1
rt
k (16)
where  is the count of simulated time slots, and rt
k the
reward from kth node in the network at time t. Note the
total number of nodes per network Ntot = Ncomm + Njam.
Hence, the metric  R reﬂects both the comm and jammer
rewards. In Fig. 4, we plot the cumulative average rewards for
BF network operating Q-learning based methods Minimax-Q,
Nash-Q, and FFQ against RF network’s static strategy over
time. Fig. 5 depicts the cumulative average rewards for BF
network operating under Minimax-Q, Nash-Q, and FFQ based
strategies against RF network’s random strategy.
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Fig. 4. Q-learning vs. Static
Under the simulation parameters that we have chosen, the
Q-learning algorithms converge to a steady-state distribution
of the BF actions within 1,000 iterations. Under such con-
vergence, the BF average cumulative reward metric seems to
approach to an asymptotically optimal value. We observe that
the minimax criterion results in a more aggressive strategy than
Nash-Q: 1) Minimax-Q converges to a steady-state cumulative
average reward value faster; and 2) it outperforms Nash-Q by
achieving slightly higher rewards over time. Static strategy has
almost no chance against the learning algorithms as its steady-
state average cumulative reward approaches to zero. On the
contrary, learning seems harder against the random strategy
particularly due to its effectiveness in jamming.
When running Minimax-Q or Nash-Q, we have conﬁgured
the BF network with the centralized control, having a single
agent that strategizes for the whole network. This means that
the agent makes all access and jamming decisions in the net-
work under an assumption that the nodes collaboratively sense
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Fig. 5. Q-learning vs. Random
channels and observe the outcome, the agent can collect this
information to facilitate Q-learning, and the nodes cooperate
by following the agent’s decision.
For FFQ, we have conﬁgured each BF node to be an
agent. This represents a scenario with the distributed control
where each node computes its own strategy. It is important to
understand that FFQ becomes identical to Minimax-Q under
our centralized control model because there are no other
friend agents to the sole agent under the centralized control
strategizing for the entire BF network, thus FFQ resorts to
using only the Foe-Q function in Eq. (15), which is the same
as the Minimax-Q function. Therefore, the use of FFQ learning
in CMNG makes sense for distributed control scenarios only.
There is no explicit cooperation among the nodes in the
distributed scenario for FFQ, and we have only provided each
BF node with information whether some node it senses on a
channel is a friend (i.e., another BF node) or foe (i.e., an RF
comm node or jammer). Interestingly, with such knowledge,
FFQ (despite under the distributed control) can achieve a good
performance that is comparable to Minimax-Q or Nash-Q in
the centralized setting where the information collected by each
node is conveniently made available to the network’s singular
policy maker. This suggests that FFQ is the most viable choice
for a network that lacks the centralized control (e.g., MANET)
among the three Q-learning techniques considered.
VI. RELATED WORK
Reinforcement learning [14] extends beyond the postulate
of Markov Decision Process that an agent’s environment is
stationary and contains no other agents. The original concept
of Q-learning was introduced by Watkins and Dayan [9].
Littman [11] proposed Minimax-Q learning for a zero-sum
two-player game. Littman and Szepesv´ ari [10] showed that
Minimax-Q converges to the optimal value suggested by game
theory. Hu and Wellman [12] described Nash-Q that was9
distinguished from Minimax-Q by solving a general-sum game
with a Nash equilibrium computation in its learning algorithm.
Nash-Q has more general applicability, but its assumptions
on the sufﬁcient conditions for convergence guarantee are
known to be restrictive. Friend-or-foe Q-learning (FFQ) [13]
converges precisely to the steady-state value that Nash-Q
guarantees. The key improvement of FFQ is relaxation of
the restrictive conditions that Nash-Q has, but FFQ requires a
priori knowledge on other agents identiﬁed as either a friend
or foe.
This paper considers some similar problems discussed by
Wang et al. [2] such as ﬁnding a strategy against hostile jam-
ming. They formulated a stochastic antijamming game played
between the secondary user and a malicious jammer, provided
sound analytical models, and applied unmodiﬁed Minimax-Q
learning to solve for the optimal antijamming strategy. Our
work is novel and differentiated from existing work by the
following. We have brought in friendly jammers to provide
an integrated, stochastic antijamming-jamming game played
between two competing cognitive radio networks. We embrace
jamming as a means to compete in a hostile environment
typically assumed in tactical mobile networking. At the same
time, we try to best the enemy jammers that pose a serious
threat to the ally comm activities. We promote the notion
of strategic jamming enabled by reinforcement learning. We
modify existing Q-learning algorithms to solve for optimal
antijamming and jamming strategies jointly.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have seen promising applications of cognitive radio
in commercial domains that suggest new, more intelligent
approaches to utilize spectrum resource. There is a growing
interest to leverage agile capabilities of cognitive radio for
tactical networking, and in this paper we have investigated
the competition and coexistence among cognitive radio nodes
that form networks in an attempt to maximize their objective.
We have considered two different types of radio devices,
namely comm node and jammer, and studied the interaction
of their common and conﬂicting interests in a stochastic game
framework. In particular, we have applied reinforcement Q-
learning techniques to strategize optimal channel accessing
schemes for comm nodes and jammers to cope with a hostile
environment possessing the same capabilities. Our results
indicate that Minimax-Q learning is more suitable for an ag-
gressive environment than Nash-Q. More interestingly, Friend-
or-foe Q-learning is most feasible for distributed mobile ad
hoc networking scenarios that can hardly expect centralized
control.
We plan to build a prototype system that can be deployed
in the CMNG environment ultimately. Our immediate future
work includes algorithmic improvements to scale the number
of nodes in a network efﬁciently, adding more friendly and
enemy networks to the current two-network model, rigorous
analysis on the accidental use of incorrect information (due
to sensing imperfections) in learning, and design of system
components such as cognitive sensing and jamming detection
at the physical and MAC layers. We also envision to enhance
our computational framework through more robust linear pro-
gramming methodologies and parallelization.
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